Abstract In [1] we present an extension of Prime Event Structures by a mechanism to express dynamicity in the causal relation. More precisely we add the possibility that the occurrence of an event can add or remove causal dependencies between events and analyse the expressive power of the resulting Event Structures w.r.t. to some well-known Event Structures from the literature. This technical report contains some additional information and the missing proofs of [1] .
Shrinking Causality
In SESs both notions of configurations, traced-based and transition-based, coincide; and in different situations, the more suitable one can be used.
Lemma 3. Let σ be a SES. Then C Tr (σ) = C(σ).
Proof. Let σ = (E, #, →, ⊲). By Def. 13 in [1] , C ∈ C Tr (σ) implies that there is some t = e 1 · · · e n such that t ⊆ E, ∀1 ≤ i, j ≤ n . ¬ (e i #e j ), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n . ic(e i ) \ dc t i−1 , e i ⊆ t i−1 , and C = t. Hence, by Def. 13 , t i → s t i+1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and ∅ → s {e 1 }. Thus, by Def. 13 , C ∈ C(σ).
By Def. 13, C ∈ C(σ) implies that there are X 1 , . . . , X n ⊆ E such that ∅ → s X 1 → s . . . → s X n and X n = C. Then, by Def. 13, we have:
′ ∈ X n . ¬ (e#e ′ ) (C2) ∀e ∈ X 1 . (ic(e) \ dc(∅, e)) ⊆ ∅ (C3) ∀1 ≤ i < n . ∀e ∈ X i+1 \ X i . (ic(e) \ dc(X i , e)) ⊆ X i (C4)
Let X 1 = {e 1,1 , . . . , e 1,m1 } and X i \ X i−1 = {e i,1 , . . . , e i,mi } for all 1 < i ≤ n. Then, by Def. 13 , t = e 1,1 · · · e 1,m1 · · · e n,1 · · · e n,mn = e
If there is a trace t 2 = e 1 · · · e n e n+1 · · · e n+m ∈ T(σ) such that Y = t 2 and ∀e, e ′ ∈ Y \ X . (ic(e) \ dc(X, e)) ⊆ X then X ⊆ Y . Moreover, by Def. 13, t 2 ∈ T(σ) implies ∀e, e ′ ∈ Y . ¬ (e#e ′ ). Thus, by Def. 13, X → s Y .
Note that the condition ∀e, e ′ ∈ Y \ X . (ic(e) \ dc(X, e)) ⊆ X states that the events in Y \ X are causally independent from each other.
As mentioned above DESs and SESs have the same expressive power. To show this fact we define mutual encodings and show that they result into structures with equivalent behaviors. To translate a SES into a DES we create a bundle for each initial causal dependence and add all its droppers to the the bundle set.
Definition 21. Let σ = (E, #, →, ⊲) be a SES. Then des(σ) = (E, #, →), where S → y iff S ⊆ E, y ∈ E, and ∃x ∈ E . x → y ∧ S = {x} ∪ [x → y] ⊲.
The above translation from SES into DES shows that for each SES there is a DES with exactly the same traces and configurations.
Lemma 5. For each SES σ there is a DES δ, namely δ = des(σ), such that T(σ) = T(δ) and C(σ) = C(δ).
Proof (Proof of Lemma 5).
Let σ = (E, #, →, ⊲) be a SES. By Defs. 12 and 1 in [1] , # ⊆ E 2 is irreflexive and symmetric. Hence, by Defs. 7 in [1] and 21, δ = des(σ) is a DES.
Let t = e 1 · · · e n . By Def. 13 in [1] , t ∈ T(σ) iff t ⊆ E, ¬ (e i #e j ), and (ic(e i ) \ dc t i−1 , e i ) ⊆ t i−1 for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. Since dc(H, e) = {e ′ | ∃d ∈ H . [e ′ → e] ⊲ d} and ic(e) = {e ′ | e ′ → e}, we have ic(e i ) \ dc t i−1 , e i ⊆ t i−1 iff ∀e ′ ∈ E . e ′ → e i =⇒ e ′ ∈ t i−1 ∨ ∃d ∈ t i−1 . [e ′ → e i ] ⊲ d for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. By Def. 21, then t ∈ T(σ) iff t ⊆ E, ¬ (e i #e j ), and X → e i =⇒ t i−1 ∩ X = ∅ for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and all X ⊆ E. Hence, by the definition of traces in § 2.2 in [1] , t ∈ T(σ) iff t ∈ T(δ), i.e. T(σ) = T(δ).
By Lem. 3, § 2.2, and Def. 13, then also C(δ) = C Tr (σ) = C(σ).
The most discriminating behavioral semantics of DESs used in literature are families of posets. Thus the translation should also preserve posets.
Theorem 11. For each SES σ there is a DES δ = des(σ), such that σ ≃ p δ.
Proof. Let σ = (E, #, →, ⊲) be a SES. By Lem. 5, δ = des(σ) = (E, #, →) is a DES such that T(σ) = T(δ) and C(σ) = C(δ). Let t = e 1 · · · e n ∈ T(σ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and the bundles X 1 → e i , . . . , X m → e i all bundles pointing to e i . For U to be a cause for e i Def. 13 in [1] 
So, by Defs. 8 and 13 in [1] , σ ≃ p δ.
In the opposite direction we map each DES into a set of similar SESs such that each SES in this set has the same behavior as the DES. Therefore for each bundle X i → e we choose a fresh event x i as initial cause x i → e, make it impossible by a self-loop x i → x i , and add all events d of the bundle X i as droppers [x i → e] ⊲ d.
Definition 22. Let δ = (E, #, →) be a DES, {X i } i∈I an enumeration of its bundles, and {x i } i∈I a set of fresh events, i.e.
Of course it can be criticized that the translation adds events (although they are fresh and impossible). But as the following example-with more bundles than events-shows it is not always possible to translate a DES into a SES without additional impossible events.
Lemma 6. There are DESs δ = (E, #, →), as e.g.
Proof (Proof of Lemma 6). Assume a SES σ = (E, #, →, ⊲) such that E = {a, b, c, d, e} and T(σ) = T(δ). According to § 2.2 in [1] , T(δ) contains all sequences of distinct events of E such that e is not the first, second, or third event, i.e. for e to occur in a trace it has to be preceded by at least three of the other events. Since by Def. 13 in [1] conflicts cannot be dropped, T(σ) = T(δ) implies # = ∅. Moreover, since e has to be preceded by at least three other events that can occur in any order, → has to contain at least three initial causes for e. W.l.o.g. let a → e, b → e, and c → e. Because of the traces abd, acd ∈ T(δ), we need the droppers [b → e] ⊲ d and [c → e] ⊲ d. Then ad ∈ T(σ) but ad / ∈ T(δ). In fact if we fix E = {a, b, c, d, e} there only finitely many different SESs σ = (E, #, →, ⊲) and for none of them T(δ) = T(σ) holds.
Note that the above lemma implies that no translation of the above DES can result into a SES with the same events such that the DES and its translation have same configurations or posets. However, because the x i are fresh, there are no droppers for the self-loops x i → x i in ses(δ). So the translation ensures that all events in {x i } i∈I remain impossible forever in the resulting SES. In fact we show again that the DES and its translation have the exactly same traces and configurations.
Lemma 7. For each DES δ there is a SES σ, namely σ = ses(δ), such that T(δ) = T(σ) and C(δ) = C(σ).
Proof (Proof of Lemma 7)
. Let δ = (E, #, →) be a DES. By Def. 7 in [1] , # ⊆ E 2 is irreflexive and symmetric. Hence, by Defs. 12, 1 in [1] , and 22, σ = ses(δ) = (E ′ , #, →, ⊲) is a SES. Let t = e 1 · · · e n . Then, by Def. 13 in [1] , t ∈ T(σ) iff t ⊆ E, ¬(e i #e j ), and (ic(e i ) \ dc t i−1 , e i ) ⊆ t i−1 for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. Note that we have t ⊆ E instead of t ⊆ E ′ , because all events in t have to be distinct and for all events in E ′ \ E there is an initial self-loop but no dropper. Since dc(H, e) = {e ′ | ∃d ∈ H . [e ′ → e] ⊲ d} and ic(e) = {e
22, then t ∈ T(σ) iff t ⊆ E, ¬ (e i #e j ), and X → e i =⇒ t i−1 ∩ X = ∅ for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and all X ⊆ E. Hence, by the definition of traces in § 2.2 in [1] , t ∈ T(σ) iff t ∈ T(δ), i.e. T(σ) = T(δ).
By Lem. 3 , the definition of configurations in § 2.2, and Def. 13, then also C(δ) = C Tr (σ) = C(σ).
Moreover the DES and its translation have exactly the same posets.
Theorem 12. For each DES δ there is a SES σ = ses(δ), such that δ ≃ p σ.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 12). Let δ = (E, #, →) be a DES. By Lem. 7, σ = ses(δ) = (E, #, →, ⊲) is a SES such that T(δ) = T(σ) and C(δ) = C(σ). Let t = e 1 · · · e n ∈ T(δ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and the bundles X 1 → e i , . . . , X m → e i all bundles pointing to e i . For U to be a cause for e i Def. 13 in [1] [3] proves that for DESs equivalence w.r.t. posets based on early causality coincides with trace equivalence. Since SESs are as expressive as DESs w.r.t. families of posets based on early causality, the same correspondence holds for SESs.
Then Theorem 2 in [1] states: Lem. 3 and Defs. 13 in [1] , σ ≃ p σ ′ and σ ≃ t σ ′ . Hence assume C(σ) = C(σ ′ ). Note that, by Def. 13 and Lem. 3 , for all C ∈ C(σ) there is a trace t ∈ T(σ) such that t = C. Moreover for every trace t ∈ T(σ) except the empty trace there is a sub-trace t ′ ∈ T(σ) and a sequence of events e 1 · · · e m such that t = t ′ e 1 · · · e m and ∀e ∈ {e 1 , . . . , e m } . ic(e) \ dc t ′ , e ⊆ t ′ . Thus, by Lem. 4 
Theorem 3 in [1] states:
SESs and EBESs are incomparable.
be the SES that is depicted in Fig. 1 . Assume there is some EBES ξ = (E, , →) such that T(σ ξ ) = T(ξ). By Def. 13 in [1] , T(σ ξ ) = {ǫ, a, c, ab, ac, ca, cb, abc, acb, cab, cba}, i.e. b cannot occur first. By Def. 6 in [1] , a disabling x y implies that y can never precedes x. Thus we have ∩ {a, b, c} 2 = ∅, because within T(σ ξ ) each pair of events of {a, b, c} occur in any order. Similarly we have → ∩{X → e | e ∈ {a, b, c} ∧ X ∩ {a, b, c} = ∅} = ∅, because x → y implies that x always has to precede y. Moreover, by Def. 6, adding impossible events as causes or using them within the disabling relation does not influence the set of traces. Thus there is no EBES ξ with the same traces as σ ξ . By Def. 6 and the definition of posets in EBESs, then there is no EBES ξ with the same configurations or posets as σ ξ .
Let ξ σ = ({e, f } , {e f } , ∅) be the EBES that is depicted in Fig. 1 . Assume there is some SES σ = (E, #, →, ⊲) such that T(ξ σ ) = T(σ). According to § 2.2 in [1] , T(ξ σ ) = {ǫ, e, f, ef }. By Def. 13 and because of the traces e and f , there are no initial causes for e and f, i.e. → ∩ {x → y | y ∈ {e, f }} = ∅. Moreover, #∩{e, f } 2 = ∅, because of the trace ef and because conflicts cannot be dropped. Thus f e ∈ T(σ) but f e / ∈ T(ξ σ ), i.e. there is no SES σ with the same traces as ξ σ . Then by Def. 13, there is no SES σ with the same configurations or families of posets as ξ σ .
Lemma 8. For each SES σ there is a RCES ρ, such that σ ≃ t ρ.
Thus σ satisfies the conditions of Def. 20. Then by Lem. 2, ρ = rces(σ) is a RCES such that σ ≃ t ρ.
Lemma 9. There is no transition-equivalent SES to the RCES ρ σ , where ρ σ = ({e, f } , {∅ ⊢ {e} , ∅ ⊢ {f } , {f } ⊢ {e, f }}).
Proof. Assume a SES
By Def. 13 in [1] and Lem. 3 and because of the configuration {e, f } ∈ C(ρ σ ), the events e and f cannot be in conflict with each other, i.e. # ∩ {e, f } 2 = ∅. Moreover, because of the configurations {e} , {f } ∈ C(ρ σ ), there are no initial causes for e and f , i.e. → ∩ {x → y | y ∈ {e, f }} = ∅. Note that the relation ⊲ cannot disable events. Thus we have ∀a, b ∈ {e, f } . ¬ (a#b) and (ic(e) \ dc({f } , e)) = ∅ ⊆ {f }. But then, by Def. 13, {f } → s {e, f }. Since {f } → rc {e, f } does not hold, this violates our assumption, i.e. there is no SES which is transition equivalent to ρ σ .
Theorem 4 in [1] states:
SESs are strictly less expressive than RCESs.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 4 in [1])
. By Lems. 9 and 8.
Alternative Partial Order Semantics in DES and SES
To show that DES and SES are not only behavioral equivalent ES models but are also very closely related at the structural level we consider the remaining four intentional partial order semantics for DES of [3] .
Liberal causality is the least restrictive notion of causality in [3] . Here each set of events from bundles pointing to an event e that satisfies all bundles pointing to e is a cause.
Definition 23 (Liberal Causality). Let δ = (E, #, →) be a DES, e 1 · · · e n one of its traces, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and X 1 → e i , . . . , X m → e i all bundles pointing to e i . A set U is a cause of
be the set of posets obtained this way for a trace t.
Bundle satisfaction causality is based on the idea that for an event e in a trace each bundle pointing to e is satisfies by exactly one event in a cause of e.
Definition 24 (Bundle Satisfaction Causality). Let δ = (E, #, →) be a DES, e 1 · · · e n one of its traces, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and X 1 → e i , . . . , X m → e i all bundles pointing to e i . A set U is a cause of e i in e 1 · · · e n if -∀e ∈ U . ∃1 ≤ j < i . e = e j and -there is a surjective mapping f :
Minimal causality requires that there is no subset which is also a cause.
Definition 25 (Minimal Causality). Let δ = (E, #, →) be a DES and let e 1 · · · e n be one of its traces, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and X 1 → e i , . . . , X m → e i all bundles pointing to e i . A set U is a cause of e i in e 1 · · · e n if -∀e ∈ U . ∃1 ≤ j < i . e = e j , -∀1 ≤ k ≤ m . X k ∩ U = ∅, and -there is no proper subset of U satisfying the previous two conditions. Let P min (t) be the set of posets obtained this way for a trace t.
Late causality contains the latest causes of an event that form a minimal set.
Definition 26 (Late Causality). Let δ = (E, #, →) be a DES, e 1 · · · e n one of its traces, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and X 1 → e i , . . . , X m → e i all bundles pointing to e i . A set U is a cause of
-there is no proper subset of U satisfying the previous two conditions, and -U is the latest set satisfying the previous three conditions. Let P late (t) be the set of posets obtained this way for a trace t.
As derived in [3] , it holds that
for all traces t. Moreover a behavioral partial order semantics is defined and it is shown that two DESs have the same posets w.r.t. to the behavioral partial order semantics iff they have the same posets w.r.t. to the early partial order semantics iff they have the same traces.
Bundle satisfaction causality is-as the name suggests-closely related to the existence of bundles. In SESs there are no bundles. Of course, as shown by the translation des(·) in Def. 21, we can transform the initial and dropped causes of an event into a bundle. And of course if we do so an SES σ and its translation des(σ) have exactly the same families of posets. But, because bundles are no native concept of SESs, we cannot directly map the definition of posets w.r.t. to bundle satisfaction to SESs.
To adapt the definitions of posets in the other three cases we have to replace Def. 13 in [1] ). The remaining conditions remain the same with respect to traces as defined in Def. 13 . Let P lib (t), P min (t), and P late (t) denote the sets of posets obtained this way for a trace t ∈ T(σ) of a SES σ w.r.t. liberal, minimal, and late causality. Moreover, let P x (δ) = t∈T(δ) P x (t) and P x (σ) = t∈T(σ) P x (t) for all x ∈ {lib, bsat, min, late}.
Since again the definitions of posets in DESs and SESs are very similar the translations des(·) and ses(·) preserve families of posets. The proof is very similar to the proofs of Ths. 11 and 12.
Theorem 13. For each SES σ there is a DES δ, namely δ = des(σ), and for each DES δ there is a SES σ, namely σ = ses(δ), such that P x (σ) = P x (δ) for all x ∈ {lib, min, late}.
Proof. The definitions of posets in DESs and SESs w.r.t. to minimal and late causality differ in exactly the same condition and its replacement as the definitions of posets in DESs and SESs w.r.t. early causality. Thus the proof in these two cases is similar to the proofs of Ths. 11 and 12.
If σ = (E, #, →, ⊲) is a SES then, by Lem. 5, δ = des(σ) = (E, #, →) is a DES such that T(σ) = T(δ) and C(σ) = C(δ). If δ = (E, #, →) is a DES then, by Lem. 7 , σ = ses(δ) = (E, #, →, ⊲) is a DES such that T(δ) = T(σ) and C(δ) = C(σ). In both cases let t = e 1 · · · e n ∈ T(σ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and X 1 → e i , . . . , X m → e i be all bundles pointing to e i .
In the case of liberal causality, for U to be a cause for e i the definition of posets in SESs requires U ⊆ ({e | e → e i ∨ ∃e ′ ∈ E . [e ′ → e i ] ⊲ e}) and (ic(e i ) \ dc(U, e i )) ⊆ U . The second condition holds iff ∀1 ≤ k ≤ m . X k ∩U = ∅ as shown in the proofs of Ths. 11 and 12. By Defs. 21 and 22, the first conditions holds iff U ⊆ (X 1 ∪ . . . ∪ X m ). So, by the definitions of posets in DESs and SESs w.r.t. to liberal causality, P lib (σ) = P lib (δ).
Growing Causality
As in SESs, both notions of configurations of GESs, traced-based and transitionbased; coincide and in different situations, the more suitable one can be used.
Lemma 10. Let γ be a GES. Then C Tr (γ) = C(γ).
By Def. 15 in [1] , C ∈ C Tr (γ) implies that there is some t = e 1 · · · e n such that t ⊆ E, ∀1 ≤ i, j ≤ n . ¬ (e i #e j ), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n . ic(e i
By Def. 15, C ∈ C(γ) implies that there are X 1 , . . . , X n ⊆ E such that ∅ → g X 1 → g . . . → g X n and X n = C. Then, by Def. 15, we have:
is a trace such that t ⊆ E (because of (D1)), ¬ e ′ i #e ′ j for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k (because of (D1) and (D2)), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k and all 1 ≤ j ≤ m i we have ic(e i,j ) ∪ ac t i−1 , e i,j ⊆ t i−1 (because of (D3), (D4), and, by (D5), ac t i−1 ∪ X i , e i,j = ac t i−1 , e i,j ), and t = C (because X n = C). Thus C ∈ C Tr (γ).
For the incomparability result between GESs and EBESs we consider two counterexamples, and show that there is no equivalent EBES or GES respectively.
Lemma 11. There is no configuration-equivalent GES to β γ (cf. Fig. 1 ).
Proof. Assume a GES
, and by Def. 15 in [1] and Lem. 10, a has to be an initial cause of c in γ, i.e. a → c. But then, by Def. 15 and Lem. 10, {b, c} / ∈ C(γ) although {b, c} ∈ C(β γ ). This violates our assumption, i.e. no GES can be configuration equivalent to β γ .
Lemma 12.
There is no trace-equivalent EBES to γ ξ (cf. Fig. 1 ).
Proof. Assume a EBES ξ = (E, #, →) such that T(ξ) = T(γ ξ ). By Def. 15 in [1] , a, c, ca, bac ∈ T(γ ξ ) and ac / ∈ T(γ ξ ). Because of a, c ∈ T(γ ξ ) and by Def. 6 in [1] , a and c have to be initially enabled in ξ, i.e. → ∩ {X → y | y ∈ {a, c}} = ∅. Moreover, because of ca, bac ∈ T(γ ξ ), a cannot disable c, i.e. ¬ (a c). But then ac ∈ T(ξ). This violates our assumption, i.e. there is no trace-equivalent EBES to γ ξ . For the incomparability between GESs and SESs, we study a GES counterexample, such that no SES is trace-equivalent.
Lemma 13. There is no trace-equivalent SES to γ σ (cf. Fig. 1 ). Def. 15 in [1] , T(γ σ ) = {ǫ, a, b, ab}. Because of the trace ab ∈ T(γ σ ) and by Def. 13 in [1] , a and b cannot be in conflict, i.e. ¬(a#b) and ¬(b#a). Moreover, because of the traces a, b ∈ T(γ σ ), there are no initial cases for a or b, i.e. → ∩ {x → y | y ∈ {a, b}} = ∅. Thus, by Def. 13, ba ∈ T(σ) but ba / ∈ T(γ σ ). This violates our assumption, i.e. no SES can be trace equivalent to γ σ .
Proof. Assume a SES σ = (E, #, →, ⊲) such that T(σ) = T(γ σ ). By

Theorem 6 in [1] states:
GESs and SESs are incomparable.
Proof (Theorem 6 in [1] ). By Lem. 13, no SES is trace-equivalent to the GES γ σ . By Def. 15 in [1] , two GES with different traces cannot have the same transition graphs. Thus no SES is transition-equivalent to the GES γ σ .
By [2] , BESs are less expressive than EBESs and by [3] , BESs are less expressive than DESs. By Th. 5 in [1] , BESs and GESs are incomparable an by Th. 1 in [1] DESs are as expressive as SESs. Thus GESs and SESs are incomparable.
To show that GESs are strictly less expressive than RCESs, we give a translation for one direction and a counterexample for the other.
Lemma 14. For each GES γ there is an RCES ρ, such that γ ≃ t ρ.
By Lem. 2, ρ = rces(γ) is an RCES and γ ≃ t ρ.
Lemma 15. There is no transition-equivalent GES to ρ γ (cf. Fig. 3 in [1] ).
Proof. Assume a GES γ = (E, #, →, ◮) such that γ ≃ t ρ γ . Then C(γ) = C(ρ γ ). By Def. 15 in [1] and because of the configuration {a, b, c} ∈ C(ρ γ ), the events a, b, and c cannot be in conflict with each other, i.e. #∩{a, b, c} 2 = ∅. Moreover, because of the configurations {a} , {b} , {c} ∈ C(ρ γ ), there are no initial causes for a, b, or c, i.e. → ∩ {x → y | y ∈ {a, b, c}} = ∅. Finally, because of the configurations {a, c} , {b, c} ∈ C(ρ γ ), neither a nor b can add a cause (except of themselves) to c, i.e. a ◮ [e → c] =⇒ e = a and b ◮ [e → c] =⇒ e = b for all e ∈ E. Thus we have ∀e, e ′ ∈ {a, b, c} . ¬ (e#e ′ ) and (ic(c) ∪ ac({a, b} , c)) = ∅ ⊆ {a, b}. But then, by Def. 15, {a, b} → g {a, b, c}. Since ¬ ({a, b} → rc {a, b, c}), this violates our assumption, i.e. there is no GES that is transition equivalent to ρ γ .
Theorem 7 in [1] states:
GESs are strictly less expressive than RCESs.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 7 in [1])
. By Lems. 14 and 15.
Dynamic Causality
In order to justify our approach of state transition equivalence, we need a notion of (configuration) transition equivalence, and show that the new equivalence is needed.
Definition 27. Let ∆ be a DCES. The set of its (reachable) configurations is C(∆) = π 1 (S(∆)); the projection on the first component of the states.
Lemma 1 in [1] states:
There are DCESs that are transition equivalent but not state transition equivalent. Lemma 16. Let ̺ be a SSDC. Then for the causal-state function cs of any state (C, cs) ∈ S(̺) it holds cs(e) = (ic(e) ∪ ac(C, e)) \ (dc(C, e) ∪ C).
Proof (Proof of Lemma 1 in [1]). We consider two DCESs
Proof. If C = ∅ the equation follows directly from the definitions of cs, ic, ac, and dc. Assume (C, cs) → d (C ′ , cs ′ ). By induction, we have cs(e) = (ic(e) ∪ ac(C, e)) \ (dc(C, e) ∪ C). We prove for each e ∈ E \ C ′ by a doubled case distinction cs ′ (e) = (ic(e) ∪ ac(C ′ , e)) \ (dc(C ′ , e) ∪ C). Let us first assume e ′ / ∈ cs(e) but e ′ ∈ cs ′ (e), then by Condition 6 in [1] we have ∃a ∈ C ′ \ C . a ◮ [e ′ → e] and since ac(C ′ , e) = {e ′ | ∃a ∈ C ′ . a ◮ [e ′ → e] ∧ a / ∈ {e, e ′ }} we have e ′ ∈ ac(C ′ , e), because ̺ is a SSDC it follows e ′ / ∈ dc(C ′ , e) and because e ∈ E \ C ′ it follows e / ∈ C. Then in this case e ′ ∈ (ic(e) ∪ ac(C ′ , e)) \ (dc(C ′ , e) ∪ C) holds. Let now still e ′ / ∈ cs(e) but e ′ / ∈ cs ′ (e), then we have by contra-position of Condition 7 we have ∄a ∈ C ′ \ C . a ◮ [e ′ → e], and so e ′ / ∈ (ic(e) ∪ ac(C ′ , e)) \ (dc(C ′ , e) ∪ C). Let us now consider the case e ′ ∈ cs(e) and here first e ′ ∈ cs ′ (e). Then by Condition 5 it follows ∄d ∈ C ′ \ C . [e ′ → e] ⊲ d. Then e ′ / ∈ dc(C ′ , e) and because e ∈ E \ C ′ it follows e / ∈ C and so e ′ / ∈ (ic(e) ∪ ac(C ′ , e)) \ (dc(C ′ , e) ∪ C). In the last case we consider e ′ ∈ cs(e) and e ′ / ∈ cs ′ (e). By Condition 4 we have
In SSDC Conditions 4, 5, 6, and 7 in [1] hold whenever C ⊆ C ′ .
Lemma 17. Let ρ be a SSDC and let (C, cs) and (C ′ , cs ′ ) be two states of ρ with C ⊆ C ′ , then Conditions 4, 5, 6, and 7 in [1] of → d hold for those two states.
Proof. By assumption Conditions 1 and 2 of Def. 18 in [1] of the transition relation holds for the two states (X ′ , cs X ′ ) and (Y ′ , cs Y ′ ). Conditions 4, 5, 6, and 7 follow from Lem. 17. Condition 8 holds because of Def. 28 and ρ is a SSDC. Condition 9 holds because it is a special case of the same conditions for (X, cs X ) and (Y, cs Y ). Let now e ∈ Y ′ \ X ′ , such that cs(e) X ′ = ∅, then there is a ∈ X ′ \ X and a c ∈ E with a ◮ [c → e], but this is a contradiction with Condition 9 of (X, cs
Definition 29. Let σ = (E, #, →, ⊲) be a SES. Then its embedding is i(σ) = (E, #, →, ⊲, ∅). Similarly let γ = (E, #, →, ◮) be a GES. Then its embedding is i(γ) = (E, #, →, ∅, ◮).
For each embedding the causal state coincides with a condition on the initial, added, and dropped causes, that are enforced in the transition relations of SESs and GESs.
Lemma 19. Let σ be a SES and i(σ) its embedding. Then we have for each state (C, cs) of i(σ), cs(e) = ic(e) \ (dc(C, e) ∪ C).
Proof. By Lem. 16 and because ac(C, e) = ∅ in i(σ) for all configurations C and events e.
Lemma 20. Let γ be a GES and i(γ) its embedding. Then we have for each state (C, cs) of i(γ), cs(e) = (ic(e) ∪ ac(C, e)) \ C.
Proof. By Lem. 16 and because dc(C, e) = ∅ in i(γ) for all configurations C and events e.
SESs (resp. GESs) and their embeddings are transition equivalent.
Lemma 21. Let µ be a GES or SES, then we have i(µ) ≃ t µ.
Proof. Let µ be a SES and C → s C ′ a transition in µ, we define for a configuration C a causality state function cs : E \ X → P(E \ X) as cs(e) = ic(e) \ (dc(X, E) ∪ X). C ′ is conflict free and C ⊆ C ′ , because C → s C ′ and Def. 13 in [1] , so Conditions 1 and 2 of Def. 18 in [1] are satisfied. Moreover in the configuration C we have cs(e) = ic(e) \ (dc(C, E) ∪ C), so Conditions 3, 4, and 5 are fulfilled. Conditions 6, 8, 7, and 9 are trivially satisfied, because ◮ = ∅, so (C, cs)
, then by Defs. 18, 13 in combination with Lem. 19 there is a transition C → s C ′ in µ. Let now µ be a GES and C → g C ′ a transition in µ, we define for a configuration X a causality state function cs : E \ X → P(E \ X) as cs(e) = (ic(e) ∪ ac(X, e)) \ X. C ′ is conflict free and C ⊆ C ′ , because C → s C ′ and Def. 15 in [1] , so Conditions 2, 1, and 9 of Def. 18 are satisfied. Moreover in the configuration C we have cs(e) = (ic(e) ∪ ac(C, e)) \ C, so Conditions 3, 6, and 7 are fulfilled. Conditions 4, 5, and 8 are trivially satisfied, because
, then by Defs. 18, 15 in combination with Lem. 20 there is a transition C → g C ′ in µ.
For the incomparability result between DCESs and SESs, we give an RCES counterexample, which cannot be modeled by a DCES.
Lemma 22. There is no transition-equivalent DCES to ρ γ (cf. Fig. 1 ).
Proof (Proof of Lemma 22). Assume
. By Def. 18 in [1] and because of the configuration {a, b, c} ∈ C(ρ γ ), the events a, b, and c cannot be in conflict with each other, i.e. # ∩ {a, b, c} 2 = ∅. Moreover, because of the configurations {a} , {b} , {c} ∈ C(ρ γ ), there are no initial causes for a, b, or c, i.e. → ∩ {x → y | y ∈ {a, b, c}} = ∅. Note that the relation ⊲ cannot disable events. Finally, because of the configurations {a, c} , {b, c} ∈ C(ρ γ ), neither a nor b can add a cause (except of themselves) to c, i.e. a ◮ [e → c] =⇒ e = a and b ◮ [e → c] =⇒ e = b for all e ∈ E. Thus we have ∀e, e ′ ∈ {a, b, c} . ¬ (e#e ′ ) and in the state ({a, b} , cs) it follows cs(c) = ∅ ⊆ {a, b}. But then, by Def. 18 
Comparing DCESs with EBESs
To compare with EBESs, we define a sub-class of DCESs, where posets could be defined and used for semantics.
Definition 30. Let EBDC denotes a subclass of SSDC with the additional requirements:
The first condition translates disabling into ◮ and ensures that disabled events cannot be enabled again. The second condition reflects causal unambiguity by ⊲ such that either the initial cause or one of its droppers can happen.
We adapt the notion of precedence.
Definition 31. Let ϑ be a EBDC and C ∈ C(ϑ), then we define the precedence relation
⊲ e. Let ≤ C be the reflexive and transitive closure of < C .
The relation < C indeed represents a precedence relation, and its reflexive transitive closure is a partial order.
Lemma 23. Let ϑ be a EBDC, C ∈ C(ϑ), and let e, e ′ ∈ C . e < C e ′ . Let also
Proof. Let (C f , cs f ) be the first occurrence of e in the sequence (C 0 , cs 0 ) → d . . . → d (C n , cs n ), so according to Condition 1 of Def. 18 in [1] it is enough to prove that e ′ / ∈ C f . First, assume that e → e ′ , then e ∈ cs 0 (e ′ ) according to the definition of cs i . Then according to Def. 18 the only situation where e / ∈ cs f −1 (e ′ ) is that there is a dropper e ′′ ∈ C f −1 for it according to Condition 4, but that is impossible since e and e ′ will be in conflict according to Condition 2 of Def. 30 . So e ∈ cs f −1 (e ′ ) and thus e ′ / ∈ C f according to Condition 3 of Def. 18. Second assume that e ′ ◮ [e → e]. If e ′ ∈ C f −1 then according to Condition 7 of Def. 18 e ∈ cs f −1 (e) which means e / ∈ C f according to Condition 3 of Def. 18, which is a contradiction to the definition of C f . Then according to Condition 9 of Def. 18 , if e ′ ∈ C f , it follows e ∈ C f −1 , which again contradicts the definition of C f . So because e ′ ∈ C, there is an h > f , such that e Lemma 24. ≤ C is a partial order over C.
Proof. Let e, e ′ ∈ C . e < C e ′ and let (∅ = C 0 , cs 0 ) . . . (C n = C, cs n ) be the transition sequence of C. Let also C h , C j be the configurations where e, e ′ first occur, respectively, then according to Lem. 23 , h < j. Since ≤ C is the reflexive and transitive closure of < C , then e ≤ C e ′ =⇒ h ≤ j. For anti-symmetry, assume that e ′ ≤ C e also then according to Lem. 23 : j ≤ h, but h ≤ j, then h = j. The only possibility for h = j is that e = e ′ because otherwise h < j and j < h, which is a contradiction.
Let P(ϑ) = {(C, ≤ C ) | C ∈ C(ϑ)} denotes the set of posets of the EBDC ϑ. We show that the transitions of a EBDC ϑ can be extracted from its posets.
Theorem 14. Let ϑ be a EBDC and (C, cs), (C ′ , cs
Proof. First, because C ′ is a configuration it is conflict free. Now let us assume ∀e, e ′ ∈ C ′ . e = e ′ ∧ e ′ ≤ C ′ e ⇒ e ′ ∈ C, we now show that all the conditions of Def. 18 in [1] hold for (C, cs) and (C ′ , cs ′ ). Condition 1, C ⊆ C ′ , holds by assumption. Conditions 4, 5, 6, and 7 follow immediately from Lem. 17 . Condition 8 follows from Def. 28 of SSDC, since ϑ is an EBDC which is a subclass of SSDC. To prove Condition 3, let f ∈ (C ′ \ C), then we have from Lem. 16 
We can ignore the case that f ′ ∈ ac(C, f ), because in EBDC the added causality for f can only be f , which would make f impossible, but this cannot be the case since f ∈ C ′ . So let us consider the remaining option:
The only growing causality is of the form m ◮ [c → c] and according to Def. 31 
Let us now assume (C, cs) → d (C ′ , cs ′ ), and e, e ′ ∈ C ′ with e = e ′ and e ′ ≤ C ′ e, so by Lem. 23 it follows e ′ ∈ C.
The following defines a translation from an EBESs into an EBDC, which is proved in Lem. 25 to be an EBDC. Furthermore this translation preserves posets. Figure 2 provides an example, where conflicts with impossible events are dropped for simplicity. Second, dces(ξ) is a SSDC, since the only dropped events are the fresh ones which are never added by ◮, so Def. 28 holds.
Third, dces(ξ) is a EBDC. Def. 30 (1) holds by definition. Bundle members in ξ mutually disable each other, then according to the definition of # ′ Condition 30(2) holds. Therefore dces(ξ) is a EBDC.
Before comparing an EBES with its translation according to posets, we make use of the following lemma.
Proof. First, ∀p ∈ P(ξ) .p ∈ P(dces(ξ)). Let p = (C, ≤ C ), then C ∈ C(ξ) by the definition of posets of EBESs. Then according to Th. 26 : C ∈ C(dces(ξ)). On the other hand, let ≤ ′ C be the partial order defined for C in dces(ξ) as in Def. 31 . This means that we should prove that ≤ C =≤ ′ C . But since ≤ C , ≤ ′ C are the reflexive and transitive closures of ≺ C , < C respectively, then it is enough to prove that ≺ C =< C . In other words we have to prove ∀e, e ′ ∈ C . e ≺ C e ′ ⇔ e ′ < C e. Let us start with e ≺ C e ′ =⇒ e < C e ′ . According to § 2. In that way we have proved that ≺ C =< C , which means that ≤ C =≤ C . In a similar way we can prove that ∀p ∈ P(dces(ξ)) .p ∈ P(ξ), which means P(ξ) = P(dces(ξ)).
Lemma 28. There is a DCES such no EBES with the same configurations exits.
Proof. We consider the embedding i(σ ξ ) (cf. Fig. 1 ) of the SES σ ξ , which models disjunctive causality. According to Def. 13 , because ¬(a#c) and ic(a) = ic(c) = ∅, it holds ∅ → s {a, c} and so {a, c} ∈ C(σ ξ ). Further there is no transition ∅ → s {b}, because ic(b) = {a}, but there are transitions {a} → s {a, b} and {c} → s {c, b}, because ic(b) \ dc({a}, b) ⊆ {a} (ic(b) \ dc({c}, b) ⊆ {c} resp.). The transitions are translated to the embedding according to Lem. 21 and Def. 27 the same holds for the configurations.
If we now assume there is a EBES ξ with the configurations ∅, {a}, {c}, {a, c}, {a, b}, {b, c} and {a, b, c} then according to Def. 5 in [1] because there is no configuration {b} there must be a non-empty bundle X → b and caused by the the configurations {a, b}, {b, c} this bundle X must contain a and c. Now the stability condition of Def. 5 implies ac and ca , so a and c are in mutual conflict contradicting to the assumption {a, c} ∈ C(ξ). Thus there is no EBES with the same configurations as i(σ ξ ) .
Theorem 10 in [1] states:
DCESs are strictly more expressive than EBESs.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 10 in [1] ). Follows directly from Lems. 28 and 27.
